Photo: Rise Up for Rojava demonstration in Athens, October 12, 2019. (Photo by Siyavash Shahabi.)
This article has been written by Siavash Daneshvar, an Iranian communist activist and political analyst. Daneshvar was imprisoned out 6 years in the early years following the 1979 Iranian revolution for communist activities. He is associated with revolutionary Marxism and worker-communism and currently serves as the head of the Political Bureau of the Worker-communist Party–Hekmatist.
The text discusses Abdullah Öcalan’s recent message advocating disarmament and the dissolution of the PKK, analyzing it within the historical context of Kurdish nationalism in the region. It argues that the current moves toward compromise, negotiation, and integration into central governments in Turkey and Syria aren’t spontaneous or forced upon the PKK, but rather strategic decisions reflecting shifts in regional power dynamics.
It critiques left-wing nationalist groups, highlighting their confusion and contradictions. These groups, stuck in outdated Cold War mindsets, view recent developments as betrayals, unable to reconcile their old revolutionary dreams with the realities of today’s politics. Kurdish nationalism, however, adapts pragmatically, aligning itself with central bourgeois forces and pursuing political and economic shares through negotiations, leaving its left-wing critics isolated and frustrated.
From a worker-communist perspective, the solution to national oppression isn’t nationalism—whether armed or peaceful—but genuine working-class unity and revolutionary struggle against capitalism. Resolving the national question through equal citizenship rights and democratic means like referendums is necessary, but real liberation ultimately depends on a socialist transformation that abolishes class distinctions entirely.
In the “Guest Author” section, I will publish or review the opinions of various Iranian writers and thinkers, particularly those from the leftist movement. The goal is to highlight their perspectives at a time when the global left largely chooses to ignore them.
Abdullah Öcalan’s message about the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK has been met with mixed reactions among various political groups. This message was not spontaneous, nor was it forced upon Öcalan solely due to pressure from the Turkish government. Even if we don’t refer back to previously failed negotiations like the Oslo talks, discussions on this matter have been ongoing for at least the past four or five months. The PKK leadership in Qandil, key figures from the HDP, and Öcalan’s trusted associates, such as Ahmet Türk, were actively involved in the back-and-forth process of these negotiations. At a stage when the talks were almost complete, the issue was made public following a call by Devlet Bahçeli, quickly resulting in Öcalan’s message. This was a deliberate and carefully calculated political decision—in other words, a strategic one—and it should be analyzed as such. The unified support from the PKK leadership and its affiliates clearly indicates that this decision was neither impulsive nor based solely on Öcalan’s personal circumstances.
The Content of Öcalan’s Message
What Abdullah Öcalan expressed in his message was by no means a new phenomenon from the perspective of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the region. Historically, Kurdish nationalism and its affiliated movements in regional countries have consistently followed a cyclical policy of “war, negotiation, war” in pursuit of agreements with central governments. The ugly and reactionary existence of national oppression, and its intensified form—the national question—has fueled movements aimed at confronting and resolving this injustice. Kurdish nationalism bases itself upon, and thrives on, this social reality.
For Öcalan and the PKK, who in recent decades have undergone significant ideological transformations, reaching an agreement—even one involving compromise and disarmament—with the Turkish state was not unprecedented. The new element this time was the call for the complete dissolution of the PKK through a congress.
Given prior preparations, Öcalan’s message was immediately endorsed unanimously by the PKK leadership and the HDP, whose seven-member delegation had met with Öcalan three times. Additionally, Selahattin Demirtaş supported the message upon his temporary release. Simultaneously, PKK-affiliated organizations such as PJAK supported Öcalan’s statement and urged the Iranian regime to adopt a similar approach.
Why Now?
Earlier attempts, such as the Oslo negotiations, did not fail because the PKK was unwilling to reach an agreement, but rather due to the continued oppressive policies of fascist Turkish governments, their upper hand, and lack of urgency for a deal. Negotiation itself is neither inherently negative nor a sign of retreat; negotiations between conflicting forces—whether reactionary or revolutionary—with states or adversaries depend largely on the balance of power. As communists, we aren’t opposed to the principle of negotiation. Indeed, following the 1979 revolution in Iran, there were moments when Kurdish representatives negotiated various issues with the central government. However, we oppose secret deals and political negotiations carried out behind people’s backs. In this specific case, this concern does not apply.
The primary reason behind Erdogan’s government’s proactive approach and the PKK’s agreement is the newly shifted balance of power and the current conditions in the Middle East—especially following the events of October 7th and the genocide in Gaza. Reactionary governments, particularly Israel, supported by the United States, seek a reactionary restructuring of the region’s political system under the label of a “New Middle East Order.” These conditions have left the Kurdish nationalist movement more uncertain and directionless than ever before.
Several critical factors contribute to the Kurdish nationalist movement’s shift in strategy and specifically to Öcalan’s message: the defeat and crisis facing the reactionary “Axis of Resistance” (led by the Islamic Republic, which included the PKK and its affiliates like PJAK in Iran); the Islamic Republic’s policies and agreements with the Iraqi government to close camps and disarm Kurdish opposition parties; ongoing developments in Syria, including regional powers competing and clashing over Syria’s future and thereby exploiting the Kurdish question; and most importantly, the transformation in the status and interests of Kurdish bourgeois forces across regional countries, whose interests increasingly clash with traditional methods of the Kurdish nationalist movement.
For these reasons, the current initiative for compromise and agreement was launched by Erdoğan’s government, driven particularly by Bahçeli’s intervention. Several months of negotiations led to a final agreement, shaped within the Ankara-Qandil-İmralı triangle. Yet the essence of this process is rooted in the material needs and urgent necessity for an agreement on both sides.
It is clear that the PKK has long ceased proactive armed operations against the Turkish state, limiting itself primarily to defensive responses. The continuation of their presence in Qandil under these conditions, combined with the growing influence of their open, civilian, and parliamentary fronts—despite constant repression and election manipulations—highlights the rising interests of Kurdish bourgeoisie in Turkey’s urban centers. Removing obstacles and denying excuses to Turkey’s fascist government has thus become a driving force behind this development.
A similar situation can be observed in Iran. Islamic reformists and a segment of educated middle-class elites demanding participation in political and administrative affairs have increasingly constrained traditional Kurdish nationalist politics, notably the Democratic Party (PDKI). This internal pressure is reflected in secret negotiations between Kurdish nationalist groups and the Islamic Republic, even amid significant mass protests and calls for regime change. The political splits within these nationalist groups, including divisions within the Democratic Party and nationalist factions in Komala, can also be explained through this lens.
In these circumstances, Kurdish nationalism is trying to adapt itself to the current reality. In Iraqi Kurdistan, nationalist forces—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—initially gained power temporarily under U.S. protection following the imposition of a “no-fly zone” after the first Persian Gulf War. Later, after the second Persian Gulf War and Saddam’s overthrow, they were integrated into Iraq’s federal government as U.S. allies. Today, Iraqi Kurdistan has become dominated by powerful Kurdish “pharaohs,” a wealthy class, and family monopolies that even restrict the minimal wages and basic rights of workers and teachers. The region has become a playground for reactionary factions, including IRGC, Turkey, and Israel.
In Syrian Kurdistan, the PYD initially reached an agreement with Bashar al-Assad at the start of the civil war, taking control of Kurdish regions. They later became U.S. allies in the fight against ISIS, relying on there support to withstand frequent Turkish attacks. With the potential fall of Assad, the need for Syria’s reconstruction, and a push toward territorial unity, negotiations with the central government became a priority. Even before Öcalan’s message, talks between Jolani and Mazloum Kobani had begun, and both sides had already described their negotiations as “positive,” emphasizing the importance of reaching an agreement. Immediately after Öcalan’s statement, these negotiations continued, leading to an agreement on Monday, March 10, outlining integration with Syrian government forces. Interestingly, the agreement stressed protecting Syrian citizens’ rights, even though just two days earlier, around a thousand civilians identified as Alawite had been massacred.
Shortly before this, in Iraq, tensions emerged over oil exports between the central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, finally resulting in an agreement on revenue-sharing after recent Kurdish elections.
In all these processes, the core logic is the same: Kurdish nationalist factions consistently negotiate and reach agreements with central governments over political and economic privileges, which aligns perfectly with their fundamental strategies.
After abandoning the concept of “Greater Kurdistan,” the idea of establishing a unified Kurdish state across the four regions, and nationalist independence claims against the Sykes-Picot agreement, particularly after Öcalan’s arrest and his subsequent ideological revisions, the PKK adopted a new framework known as “Democratic Confederalism.” This approach rejects the “nation-state” model, advocating instead a so-called “democratic nation.”
This shift involved abandoning the Stalinist foundations upon which the PKK was originally built, adopting instead a blend of eco-anarchism inspired by Murray Bookchin and identity-based democracy, praising ethnicity, religion, and minorities. Bookchin himself was a Stalinist before becoming an anarchist. Central to Öcalan’s new politics and his affiliated parties and groups is abandoning the policy of overthrowing central governments through armed struggle, focusing instead on negotiation and partnership with these governments.
From this perspective, Öcalan today isn’t particularly worried about the PKK’s dissolution, as the HDP already achieves the same objectives previously sought through armed nationalist struggle. Following the Cold War, Kurdish nationalism in Iran mirrored Iraqi Kurdistan’s model, seeking agreements with Iranian nationalist currents through a formula of federalism. Both federalists and confederalists have followed the same classical nationalist path, always seeking compromise and partnership with central capitalist currents and states.
If such a path hasn’t fully materialized in Iran, it isn’t due to reluctance from Kurdish nationalist parties, but rather due to the atmosphere of revolutionary demands within Iran and the unwillingness of the Islamic Republic itself.
Kurdish nationalism in the region is currently undergoing a process of redefining itself based on ongoing regional conflicts and is trying to find its position accordingly. The Turkish government is deeply concerned about Israel’s strengthening position and its attempts to leverage the Kurdish issue—particularly in Syria—as a strategic tool. Turkey aims to solidify its position and sideline a decades-long domestic issue, secure the electoral support of millions of Kurdish voters, and prevent internal unrest from affecting its regional competition.
Monday’s agreement in Damascus would not have been possible without approval from both the Turkish government and the PKK. Turkey itself is compelled, at least temporarily, to offer some concessions to stabilize its regional position, especially in Syria. For the PKK and the democratic forces in Syria, this represents their ultimate victory: integrating into these countries’ political systems as recognized legal parties. Therefore, unlike segments of left-wing nationalism concerned about these developments, they view Öcalan’s message and the Syrian agreement as “historic” milestones.
Given the nature of Turkey’s government and its allies in Syria and considering their dark historical record, we approach this process with skepticism. At the same time, we acknowledge their immediate need for survival and recognize the practical necessity driving these compromises.
Grumbling and Contradictions of Left-wing Nationalism
The current developments—particularly Öcalan’s message, anxiety over its consequences, and the recent agreement in Damascus—have predictably sparked complaints from left-wing nationalist circles. A range of organizations and figures, have expressed deep concern or labeled these developments a “betrayal” of the Kurdish cause or “capitulation.” These reactions reveal the core contradictions within left-wing nationalism regarding the national question.
For left-wing nationalists, concepts like the “people,” the national struggle, and popular movements have inherent and absolute value. Their highest revolutionary ideal is armed struggle; any group taking up arms automatically earns revolutionary credentials. Even Islamic forces, when involved in a popular nationalist struggle, are perceived as “resistance fighters” or revolutionaries by these currents. Conversely, laying down arms or ending armed struggle is instantly seen as capitulation or outright betrayal of the national cause.
Within this framework, class struggle has little significance; at best, it’s seen as secondary or merely complementary to the broader nationalist movement. For these groups, the Kurdish worker matters only as long as he serves the national liberation movement, with class struggle reduced to a transitional phase within the broader nationalist project.
Initially, these left-wing nationalists warned that the main threat targeted “Rojava,” though their fundamental concern was always the dissolution of the PKK and criticism of Öcalan’s perceived “surrender.” Now that an agreement in Syria has materialized, they find themselves stuck: on one hand, they face Julani’s troubling regime, while on the other hand, Mazloum Kobani—someone they’ve previously celebrated as a Kurdish Che Guevara—has accepted compromise.
These contradictions remain unsolvable for left-wing nationalists still trapped in Cold War-era Stalinist thinking. Of course, organizational self-interest and factional calculations further complicate their already troubled stance.
Communism’s approach to national oppression and solving the national question is fundamentally different
First of all, for any serious communist, the answer to national oppression—or any kind of oppression—is to eliminate it entirely. Solving the national question is not a complicated puzzle. People who historically have been deprived of peaceful coexistence due to chauvinist and oppressive governments either have the right to separate and form their own independent state, or remain within the existing political geography enjoying full and equal rights as citizens. The practical mechanism for resolving this is through a referendum that directly asks the people’s preference, accompanied by corresponding changes in the country’s laws.
The national question isn’t inherently a principle of communism; it’s a problem that capitalism, like every other issue, should have resolved long ago. But when oppression exists, the issue becomes real, and communists never turn their backs or remain indifferent. This is because communism, fundamentally, is a movement aimed at eliminating discrimination, oppression, and inequalities on all levels. Moreover, communists recognize that any form of unresolved oppression gives rise to movements that typically carry reactionary agendas and are ultimately incapable of eliminating oppression.
For instance, addressing national oppression is just and legitimate, but nationalist movements arising in its name pursue their own constitutional arrangements, aiming to secure their share of political power within existing ruling-class structures. They inherently have no interest in genuinely resolving ethnic or national divisions; instead, they perpetuate these divisions through identity politics, because their survival depends precisely on the continuation of such divides.
A genuine resolution of the national question would negate the very reason nationalist movements exist. Nationalism, therefore, is incapable of solving the national question.
The existence of an unresolved national question inevitably divides workers’ struggle against the bourgeoisie, turning workers into foot soldiers for competing bourgeois factions. Workers become tools in nationalist rivalries over domestic markets and shares of the overall exploitation of the working class. This seriously complicates and disrupts the course of class struggle.
Communists actively intervene against all forms of oppression and propose solutions and programs precisely because they understand nationalism doesn’t genuinely seek to eliminate oppression. Instead, nationalism institutionalizes oppression, converting it into a channel for power and competition among bourgeois factions. When communists eliminate national oppression, it leads to the empowerment and unity of workers across ethnic or national divisions. Nationalists, on the other hand, exploit artificial identities and promote conflict among different groups.
Thus, communists firmly advocate solving the national question and eliminating national oppression because it strengthens and advances class struggle. They see this process as fundamentally about uniting the workers of both the oppressed and oppressor nations against their common class enemy—the bourgeoisie. A Kurdish-speaking worker in Iraqi Kurdistan today identifies Kurdish billionaires and elites as enemies just as strongly as they once saw Arab-speaking capitalists. Similarly, by resolving the Kurdish issue in Turkey—and soon in Syria—Kurdish workers will inevitably find themselves confronting their own national bourgeoisie. It’s precisely the pressure exerted by this working-class dynamic that pushes figures like Öcalan toward dissolving the PKK, disarming, and seeking political partnership within Turkey’s mainstream political establishment.
The current situation, particularly Öcalan’s message and the anxiety surrounding its consequences, reflects a consistent strategy of Kurdish nationalism: forming partnerships with central bourgeoisies in Turkey and Syria. Contrary to the complaints and contradictions expressed by left-wing nationalism, the Kurdish nationalist movement’s recent steps represent nothing new. Their fundamental goal—achieving political integration and power-sharing with central governments—remains unchanged. This goal could have been pursued through war, revolution, or negotiation. But, in each scenario, the aim has always been the same: ensuring Kurdish nationalism’s participation in central bourgeois power structures.
Left-wing nationalism grumbles about betrayal, labeling these moves as a sellout of the Kurdish cause. They hoped nationalist struggles would stretch into a kind of popular “socialism.” But that era is over. Kurdish nationalism has accurately read the changing conditions and adapted itself accordingly, whether through war, revolution, or negotiation. Meanwhile, left-wing nationalism remains stuck in outdated Cold War narratives, still accusing its “older brother,” mainstream nationalism, of betrayal, unable to accept that nationalism itself has recognized new political realities and adjusted accordingly.
But what is the solution offered by this marginalized, directionless left-wing nationalism? Forming militant Kurdish youth organizations to uphold the same old nationalist ideals and continuing armed struggle? Should they simply revive the same tired dreams and restart armed resistance? Those who themselves have long given up active combat now call for militancy they no longer lead.
At least the mainstream (“big brother”) Kurdish nationalists secure some material gains through negotiation and compromise, acquiring limited privileges and resources. Meanwhile, the left-wing nationalists—trapped in outdated fantasies—are left empty-handed, doomed to frustration, bitterness, and irrelevance.
Our position as worker-communists is clear: we neither directly benefit from nor share the nationalist goals behind these agreements. We have no immediate interest in their political compromises, nor are we partners in their ambitions. What we advocate is exactly what the working class and the majority of ordinary people in Turkey and Syria demand: an end to war and oppression; an end to political repression and the excuses used to justify it; an end to violence and the arrests of political dissidents in the name of “security.”
We demand what most ordinary citizens and workers in Turkey and Syria desire: an immediate end to detention, persecution, and suppression of political freedoms; recognition of equal citizenship rights regardless of ethnicity, religion, or political views; the end of national oppression; and genuine equality for all residents. These principles—rather than nationalist ambitions—are at the heart of our struggle.
Our position, as worker-communists, is clear and straightforward: we seek an immediate end to oppression and war, an end to militarism and political repression by the Turkish and Syrian governments, and conditions favorable to genuine working-class unity across Turkey and Syria against the bourgeoisie, regardless of the colors of their flags.
For worker communism, resolving national oppression means removing obstacles to working-class unity and struggle. Solving the national question is essential—not as an end in itself, but because it removes one major tool of division and oppression. Yet, eliminating national oppression alone does not guarantee workers’ freedom. True liberation for workers in Turkey, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and across the region can only be achieved through intensifying class struggle, overthrowing capitalism through workers’ revolution, abolishing class divisions, and establishing socialism.
What you think?