Kazem Farajollahi’s article, “The Iranian Working Class and the Triple Trap,” is a powerful and detailed explanation of the struggles that Iranian workers face today. It was published on May 1st, 2024 — International Workers’ Day — a date that has special meaning for labor movements around the world. The article begins with a dedication to two women workers, Reyhaneh and Sharifeh, who, according to the author, have fought honestly and independently for the freedom and happiness of the working class. It is also dedicated to all the workers who have been arrested or jailed for defending labor rights in Iran.
Farajollahi is a long-time labor rights advocate and writer in Iran. In this article, he doesn’t speak as a distant observer. He writes from inside the system, using facts, numbers, real examples, and his own political analysis. His goal is not just to describe the suffering of workers, but to help them understand how the system works against them — and what kind of change is needed.
The article is not emotional or poetic. It is clear, structured, and full of hard information. Farajollahi explains how the Iranian working class is trapped in a crisis made of three connected problems: poverty wages, unsafe and unstable jobs, and the lack of freedom to organize. He argues that these are not accidental or temporary problems — they are part of the capitalist system in Iran, and they are maintained by state policy.
It is important to note that the author of this article is a well-known and officially permitted figure within Iran—someone who generally avoids sensitive security issues such as independent labor unions or organized collective action. Figures like this, often introduced as “experts” on state-affiliated media, are usually either not recognized by grassroots labor activists or lack credibility among them.
Nevertheless, even these “approved” voices, in the absence of independent labor organizations and free media, sometimes highlight horrifying aspects of the condition of Iran’s working class. Paying attention to such accounts is still important. That is why this report is being republished here—with special attention to this context.
In the “Guest Author” section, I will publish or review the opinions of various Iranian writers and thinkers, particularly those from the leftist movement. The goal is to highlight their perspectives at a time when the global left largely chooses to ignore them.
How the Article is Structured
Farajollahi’s article follows a clear, step-by-step structure. It begins with a short historical introduction and then focuses on the 2023 of labor struggles in Iran. He uses official statistics, government statements, and media reports to support his argument, while also showing where these sources are limited or manipulated.
The main body of the article is divided into thematic sections, each focusing on one key area of crisis for the working class. These sections are not just descriptions — they are analytical. Farajollahi explains how state policies and economic structures are designed to keep workers poor, insecure, and disorganized. He also includes a table with minimum figures from ILNA, Iran’s labor news agency, that shows the number of strikes, accidents, deaths, protests, and suicides in the last year. He uses these figures to show that the situation is far worse than what is officially reported.
The article builds toward a conclusion, where he presents a political metaphor: Iranian workers are trapped inside a three-sided wall — made of low wages, insecure jobs, and blocked organization. But this conclusion is not hopeless. Farajollahi argues that there is still a way out, but it requires awareness, struggle, and real independent organization from below.
This structure — facts, analysis, and a political call — makes the article not only informative but also strategic. It is written for workers, not just about them.
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Working Class Under Pressure: Violence and Protest
Farajollahi begins the main analysis by describing the daily struggles of Iranian workers in the past year. He makes it clear: not a single day passed without protest or conflict between workers and their employers or the state. Workers faced not only low and delayed wages, but also dangerous working conditions, job insecurity, and total lack of support from government institutions.
To explain the level of crisis, Farajollahi provides numbers from Iran’s labor news agency (ILNA), even though he points out that these are minimum figures, and real numbers are likely much higher. According to this data (May 2023 – April 2024), Iranian workers experienced:
- 425 protest gatherings
- 101 workplace-related protests
- 290 protests by retirees
- 22 strikes and 3 sit-ins
- 18 suicides that led to death
- Over 320 workers died and nearly 600 were injured in workplace accidents.
To find new reports and data about 2024, see this article.
He also quotes other official sources to show the contrast. For example, the Legal Medicine Organization reported over 2,115 work-related deaths in just one year — far more than the figures reported in labor media. This shows the scale of workplace danger and how underreported labor issues are in Iran.
Farajollahi argues that despite the lack of unions and government repression, workers across many industries continued to resist. He emphasizes that protests are not just spontaneous — they are responses to a system that denies basic rights, even the right to survive.
Job Insecurity and Workplace Hazards
Farajollahi explains that job insecurity is not just a result of poor economic conditions — it is a planned outcome of decades of neoliberal labor policies in Iran. Over the past 30 years, the government and private sector have removed permanent jobs and replaced them with short-term contracts, often lasting just one to three months. Many workers sign blank contracts or work for subcontractors who offer no protection or benefits.
This system creates a situation where workers are forced to accept any condition just to survive. Even though the government claims it creates one million jobs every year, there is no evidence of this in the number of insured workers. Farajollahi points out that a large “army of unemployed” — at least 2.5 million people — remains ready to take any job, which further weakens the bargaining power of existing workers.
But insecurity is not only about losing a job. It also means unsafe work conditions. Many workplaces lack proper safety standards, especially in construction, mining, and factories. Farajollahi brings together several local government reports to show how the number of workplace deaths and injuries is rising every year:
- In Ardabil province: 29 deaths and 406 injuries in just 9 months.
- In Khorasan Razavi: 104 deaths from work accidents in the same period.
- In East Azerbaijan: workplace accidents increased by 28%.
- Nationally, in the first half of 2023: 1,077 workers died — a 15.7% increase over the year before.
Despite this, government officials deny the crisis. One deputy labor minister even claimed that workplace accidents have decreased by 14%, a statement Farajollahi calls “nonsense.”
He also notes that psychological safety — especially for women workers — is often ignored. Although he does not go into detail, he refers to problems like sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and a male-dominated culture that worsens the mental health of women in the workplace.
Overall, Farajollahi presents a picture of a workforce that is both unprotected and silenced — pushed into dangerous jobs without safety nets or the freedom to protest without punishment.
Workers’ Protests and the Two Worlds of Labor
Farajollahi shows that workers across Iran are not silent — they protest regularly. But the types of protests, and the conditions behind them, are very different depending on the industry and the economic health of the workplace.
He explains that worker protests happen in two main zones:
1. Profitable Sectors: Oil, Petrochemicals, Steel, Automotive
These companies make high profits and have large workforces. Even though they don’t allow independent unions, workers there tend to have more awareness of their economic power. Their protests usually demand better bonuses, overtime pay, or removal of wage limits — not just survival wages.
But even here, Farajollahi criticizes the limited focus of these protests. Because these workers already earn more than minimum wage, they often don’t demand an increase in minimum wage for all workers, which he sees as a necessary, collective demand.
He also reveals that the government and employers divide workers by creating many different types of contracts in the same workplace. For example, in oil or gas companies, workers with the same skills might be employed by different subcontractors, under very different conditions. Some demand better benefits, while others just want their basic unpaid wages.
2. Poorer Sectors: Small and Medium Factories, Struggling Industries
In less profitable industries, things are worse. Workers often go months without being paid. Contracts are not renewed, or benefits like insurance are canceled without notice. Many of these workers are unorganized and desperate, and after going through formal complaint systems that lead nowhere, they take their protests to the streets, in front of government buildings or public squares.
These workers face heavy punishment: dismissals, arrests, and even beatings. Farajollahi emphasizes that the lack of independent worker organizations makes all of this worse. Without collective strength or legal support, many workers risk everything just to demand their rights.
He also notes a key point: most protests are still about wages — not safety, insurance, or working conditions. Why? Because hunger comes first. And because workers are isolated and poorly organized, they often can’t push for broader or long-term changes. Survival always comes first.
Farajollahi’s argument is clear: while workers are protesting across many regions and sectors, the division between workers, created by the contract system and economic inequality, makes a unified labor movement very difficult — and that is exactly what the system wants.
Retirees and the Silent Movement
Farajollahi devotes part of the article to a group that is often forgotten in labor politics: retired workers. He explains that more than 70% of retirees in Iran live on minimum pensions — or even less. These pensions don’t cover half of the cost of basic living. A small number of retired managers receive higher pensions, but they are the exception. Most retired workers struggle with poverty, illness, and isolation.
Unlike active workers, retirees can’t go on strike or pressure a specific employer. They have no workplace, no daily interaction with fellow workers, and often suffer from physical health problems. This makes it harder for them to protest. Also, many so-called “retirees’ associations” are either state-run or closely controlled by the government, meaning they don’t support real organizing.
And yet, Farajollahi shows that retirees are still protesting. Thanks to smartphones, social media, and messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram, many retirees have been able to organize informal protest networks, especially during the 2010s and early 2020s. He calls this the “retirees’ movement” — a loose but growing form of resistance.
This movement became more visible during the years just before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Retirees organized regular protests in public squares, especially in front of parliament or pension offices. They demanded fair pensions, medical support, and respect. Some of their demands were partially met, which led to fewer protests in 2022 and 2023. But Farajollahi warns: the anger hasn’t gone away.
He believes that as long as the government treats retirees as a burden on the budget, and refuses to return their rightful pensions, these protests will return. In his words, the regime gives retirees “respectful names” in public speeches but treats them like a useless cost to be silenced.
In the end, the retirees’ movement — quiet, scattered, but persistent — reflects the same struggles as the rest of the working class: survival, dignity, and the need for independent organization.
The Politics of Wage Suppression
Farajollahi argues that Iran’s wage system is not just unfair — it is designed to keep workers poor. He focuses on how the Supreme Labor Council, the body responsible for setting the minimum wage every year, works in practice. While the council is supposed to follow a three-party structure (workers, employers, and the government), he explains that this model has never existed in reality in Iran.
The council is officially led by the Minister of Labor, who also represents the government — one of the biggest employers in the country. Independent labor organizations have been banned or crushed since the early 1980s, so the so-called worker representatives in the council are not truly independent. Worse, the minister has veto power, meaning any decision can be overruled by the state.
In 2024, after a year of extreme inflation, the council approved a 35% increase in the base minimum wage — raising it to around 7 million tomans per month (less than $100). This still covers less than half of the officially recognized cost of living. Even more shocking, other wage levels (for more experienced or skilled workers) were only raised by 22% — a strategy Farajollahi calls a “deliberate policy of legalized impoverishment.”
Farajollahi uses a striking example to show how much workers have lost: in 1981, a worker earning minimum wage could buy the equivalent of 9.5 gold coins in a year. In 2024, they can only buy 2.4 — even though gold is a stable measure of value. This long-term decline, he says, is not an accident. It’s a result of government policy that favors cheap labor for investors, both domestic and foreign.
He criticizes a specific mechanism called “other wage levels” — a system where higher-paid workers (due to experience, skill, or seniority) get a lower percentage increase than those on the minimum wage. This means over time, even experienced workers are pushed closer to the poverty line. This policy, used every year since 1981, has silently flattened wages and made nearly all workers equally poor.
Farajollahi notes that this wage suppression also affects retired workers, whose pensions are based on past wages and insurance contributions. However, pensions are not paid from the government budget, but from retirement funds built over decades. Still, the government uses similar excuses — like inflation control or budget limits — to avoid raising pensions, even though the money technically doesn’t come from the state.
Finally, Farajollahi calls out the false logic used by ministers and officials to justify wage suppression. They often say that higher wages will cause more inflation. But economic studies — including by Iran’s own parliament research center — show that wages make up only 5%–10% of the cost of production in most industries. So even if wages doubled, the effect on prices would be small.
Instead, Farajollahi says, these arguments are excuses to protect investor profits, and to maintain a labor force that is obedient, exhausted, and cheap.
The Triple Trap and the Way Out
At the end of his article, Farajollahi introduces a powerful metaphor: the Iranian working class is caught inside a “three-sided wall.” This image summarizes everything he has explained throughout the text — it is not just a description, but a political diagnosis of how the system works to trap workers. The three walls are:
- Low wages and deepening poverty
- Job insecurity and fear of unemployment
- Blockage of independent organization
Together, these walls create a condition in which most workers are too poor, too afraid, and too isolated to fight back effectively. Many workers are so busy trying to survive that they can’t think beyond tomorrow’s bread. The fear of losing their job keeps them quiet. And even when they try to organize, the state uses temporary contracts, legal barriers, and punishments to prevent them from building strong unions or collectives.
Any serious attempt to organize is usually met with firing, blacklisting, legal threats, or arrest. Many activists are labeled as “security threats” simply for trying to form a union. This is especially dangerous in workplaces with subcontractors, where a simple contract cancellation means instant dismissal, without rights or compensation.
But Farajollahi doesn’t end the article in despair. He argues that there is a way out — but it is not easy. To escape the three-sided wall, workers need three tools, all at the same time:
- Awareness: Understanding how the system functions and recognizing that poverty is not natural or accidental — it is designed.
- Organization: Building real, independent, grassroots unions or collectives that reflect the will of workers, not state or employer agendas.
- Struggle: Taking action, both defensive and offensive, to demand fair wages, secure jobs, and labor rights.
He warns against shortcuts. For example, fake unions, organizations created “from above,” or paper-based federations without worker participation are useless or even harmful. These structures divide workers, create confusion, and waste energy.
Farajollahi also calls for using modern tools like digital communication and social networks to overcome censorship and geographic distance. But he emphasizes that nothing can replace face-to-face trust, real organizing, and collective strength.
He is also very clear about the role of the state. In his view, capitalist governments — including Iran’s — always try to block worker organizing. No government, no matter how reformist it claims to be, will willingly allow a strong working-class movement to grow. So labor organizing must expect resistance and be ready to act with long-term commitment and political clarity.
Why This Article Matters
Kazem Farajollahi’s article is more than a report on labor conditions in Iran. It is written by a well-known and officially tolerated figure inside the country—someone who generally stays within the limits imposed by the Islamic regime. He avoids directly addressing red-line issues such as the repression of political parties, the criminalization of independent unions, or grassroots organizing led by workers themselves. This makes what he does say all the more telling.
While Farajollahi may not directly challenge the security apparatus or the structure of repression, his work still provides valuable insight into the everyday realities of Iran’s working class. In the absence of free media and independent union structures, even voices like his—operating within a restricted space—can at times reveal the scale of exploitation and the intensity of social suffering. That is why this article matters: it gives us a glimpse of what is usually hidden, even if it doesn’t say everything.
The article’s political framing also reflects a broader issue: not just the regime’s repression, but the political approach of those who write and think within its limits. While Farajollahi may not advocate for bottom-up worker self-organization, he still documents the unbearable conditions that make such organizing urgent.
His framework remains rooted in the idea of reforming within limits. While he recognizes the historical role of both political and trade union formations, he carefully avoids calling for oppositional organizing. Instead, he encourages workers to experiment with new forms of organization that operate within what is not explicitly prohibited by law. His focus is on building pressure through semi-official or tolerated channels—shaped by both the structural limitations of the Islamic regime and a political strategy that aims to expand space incrementally rather than confront the system head-on.
In this sense, Farajollahi represents a kind of tolerated reformism from below—pushing for organization and change, but from within the narrow margins of what is politically permissible. His emphasis on the psychological barriers to organizing, rather than only state repression, shows his effort to shift workers’ consciousness without openly challenging the regime’s red lines. It is precisely this balancing act—between realism and quiet resistance—that makes his writing both cautious and politically revealing.
For non-Iranian readers, this piece is a rare entry point into the internal debates and silences surrounding labor in Iran. It offers more than just facts—it indirectly maps the boundaries of permissible speech, while still pointing to deeper contradictions. The system is exposed: one built on low wages, precarious contracts, and blocked collective power. These aren’t policy failures. They are core features of the political-economic order.
This article should not be read as a radical manifesto, but as a warning from inside a tightly controlled environment. It helps us understand how much is being repressed, and how even cautious observations can, in the absence of stronger collective structures, become windows into a much larger crisis. That’s why I republishing it here: not because it says everything, but because in what it dares to say—and what it cannot—it reveals more than intended.
