In recent years, Iran has intensified its enforcement of compulsory hijab laws through the deployment of advanced surveillance technologies. While the national implementation of these laws has faced challenges and public resistance, certain regions, notably Isfahan, have become focal points for stringent enforcement measures.
Isfahan, a major city in central Iran, has witnessed the integration of various surveillance tools aimed at monitoring and controlling women’s adherence to the state’s dress code. These tools include International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers, contactless card readers, and extensive networks of surveillance cameras. Such technologies enable authorities to identify, track, and intimidate women who are perceived to violate hijab regulations.
The implementation of these measures in Isfahan reflects a broader strategy by Iranian authorities to suppress dissent and enforce social conformity. Despite the official shelving of the national hijab law following widespread protests, the continued use of surveillance in cities like Isfahan underscores the government’s commitment to maintaining control over women’s public appearance.
This report delves into the specific surveillance mechanisms employed in Isfahan, examining their operational methods, legal implications, and the responses they have elicited both domestically and internationally. By shedding light on these practices, the report aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the intersection between technology, state control, and women’s rights in contemporary Iran.
The Surveillance Apparatus in Isfahan
In April 2025, Filterban (a digital rights watchdog based outside Iran) released a detailed investigation into a multi-layered and secretive surveillance system operating in Isfahan. According to their report, this system is a joint project managed by security, judicial, police, and telecommunications bodies. It is designed specifically to identify, monitor, and threaten women who do not follow the state-mandated hijab dress code.
At the core of this system is a powerful surveillance device known as an IMSI-catcher. This tool tricks mobile phones into connecting to it by pretending to be a legitimate cell tower with the strongest signal in the area. Once a phone connects, the device can extract sensitive information, including:
- The IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) number
- The IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number
- In some cases, the location of the phone and its user
Filterban revealed that these devices are deployed in three main ways across Isfahan:
- Handheld units: These are carried by officers on foot patrol, with a range of 100 to 500 meters. They are used in crowded or sensitive areas to get close to specific targets.
- Vehicle-mounted units: Installed on security vehicles, they can cover 1 to 2 kilometers and are used to monitor key urban zones.
- Fixed units: Placed in strategic locations, like central squares and tourist areas, with a reach of up to 5 kilometers. These are likely used to maintain continuous surveillance over larger parts of the city.
Filterban estimates that 30 to 35 square kilometers of central Isfahan—particularly tourist-heavy areas—are under constant observation by these tools.
But IMSI-catchers are only part of the network. The report also describes two other technologies being used:
- Contactless card readers: These readers use technologies like NFC (near-field communication) to collect data such as national ID numbers from smart cards, including metro cards and national ID cards. Officers carrying these readers must come within one meter of a person to extract the data.
- Surveillance cameras: Installed throughout the city and operated by the police, these cameras automatically identify women who do not comply with the official dress code. They then send this information—including the woman’s location—to ground teams equipped with IMSI-catchers or card readers.
This combined system allows the state to not only locate women in real-time but also to collect personal information like their names, national IDs, addresses, and family members—without their consent or knowledge. This entire apparatus, according to Filterban, functions as a system of “monitoring, tracking, and intimidation”—a clear attempt to control public behavior through fear and digital repression.
Operational Mechanics of the Surveillance System
Once data is collected through IMSI-catchers, contactless card readers, and surveillance cameras, it is sent through a centralized system involving mobile network operators and state databases. This process is designed not only to identify individuals but to intimidate them with direct, targeted warnings.
Authorities match the gathered information—such as IMSI numbers, national ID data, or surveillance images—with government databases. This allows them to uncover a person’s full identity: name, national ID number, home address, and family members. The goal of this step is to make sure that every warning sent is personal and threatening enough to pressure individuals into compliance.
Women identified through this system begin receiving text message warnings. These messages often come from official-looking numbers and are designed to frighten the recipient. In many cases, they mention the exact location where the woman was seen, suggesting that the state is always watching.
Some women have reported receiving messages not only on their own phones but also on the phones of their family members—especially their fathers or husbands. In one widely shared example, a father was told via SMS to “take necessary steps” to make sure his daughter respects the dress code. The message made it clear that his daughter had been observed in public without proper hijab.
These messages typically come from departments responsible for enforcing Islamic behavior laws, but in some cases, they are sent from unknown or changing numbers. This suggests that several different government bodies may be involved in the process, possibly sharing data and working in coordination.
The surveillance program in Isfahan is not run by a single authority. Instead, it is a coordinated project between several major institutions:
- Law enforcement agencies
- Intelligence and security services
- Judiciary branches
- Telecommunications companies
Each plays a different role: gathering data, managing databases, confirming identities, and delivering threats. While public officials often deny that surveillance tools are being used, reports from organizations like Filterban and testimonies from residents of Isfahan contradict these claims.
Beyond legal threats, the system is built to create fear. By sending personalized messages that prove the individual has been followed or identified, the state creates a strong psychological pressure. Women are made to feel unsafe in public. Even family members feel watched and responsible, which can lead to increased domestic control and restriction on women’s movements.
Screenshot of Negin’s post on social media, a woman from Isfahan, showing the SMS messages sent to her and to her father. In recent weeks, domestic media have also been full of reports by women describing receiving similar messages.
Legal and Ethical Implications
The surveillance system exposed in Isfahan raises serious legal and ethical concerns. At its core, this operation violates fundamental rights such as privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement—rights that are protected under both Iran’s own constitution and international human rights law.
Using IMSI-catchers to intercept mobile phone data without consent is a form of mass surveillance that bypasses judicial oversight. These devices collect sensitive personal data from phones that automatically connect to them, often without the user even knowing. In many democratic countries, using such devices without a court order is considered illegal. In Iran, there is little transparency about how these tools are used or whether any legal procedures are followed at all.
Contactless card readers and surveillance cameras also collect private information in public spaces. Although they may appear less intrusive, their use for targeting individuals based on clothing choices turns everyday technologies into instruments of control. When combined, these tools allow the state to build a full digital profile of a person in real time—and without their knowledge or permission.
Citizens who receive threatening messages have no clear way to challenge the accusations or verify the evidence. They are not informed through official legal channels, and there is no public system for appealing or correcting such actions. The messages are meant to scare, not to open dialogue. This creates a system where women are punished and shamed without being charged, tried, or defended—what some have described as a “digital trial without a court.”
Technology is often promoted as a way to improve life—through communication, efficiency, and connection. But in this case, it is used to punish personal choices and enforce a specific ideological vision of public behavior. The system in Isfahan is a clear example of how digital tools can be turned into weapons when they are controlled by authoritarian structures.
Iran is a member of several international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees freedom of thought, expression, and privacy. The surveillance measures used in Isfahan directly conflict with these protections.
Numerous human rights organizations—including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—have criticized Iran for using technology to silence dissent and monitor its citizens. These organizations have also warned that using surveillance to enforce morality laws is a growing threat in authoritarian regimes around the world.
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Public and International Response
The exposure of this surveillance system in Isfahan has sparked public anger and international concern. Inside Iran, people—especially women—have reacted with fear, frustration, and resistance. Outside the country, human rights organizations and digital privacy advocates are raising alarms about how Iranian authorities are using digital technologies to control public behavior and punish dissent.
Many Iranians were not surprised to hear about the existence of such a system. For years, women have reported receiving anonymous text messages after appearing in public without the mandatory hijab. But the details revealed by Filterban—especially the use of IMSI-catchers and close-range ID scanners—confirmed the technical and organized nature of the crackdown.
Women in Isfahan have shared their experiences on Persian-language social media platforms, describing how they were monitored, warned, or even followed. Some have received messages that mention the exact time and place they were seen. Others say that their fathers or brothers were contacted and told to “correct” their behavior. These actions are meant to shame women and involve families in enforcing state policies.
This has led to widespread anger. Critics say the government is violating digital privacy and criminalizing clothing choices. Even some people who support the hijab in principle have spoken out against the use of surveillance and threats to enforce it.
At the same time, many citizens are afraid. The awareness that their phone can be tracked or their ID scanned from a few meters away is deeply unsettling. Some have started turning off their phones in public or covering their faces from surveillance cameras. This fear has created a kind of digital silence—where people feel they must censor themselves even in physical public spaces.
Civil rights activists and lawyers inside Iran have called this system a form of digital espionage against citizens. They argue that instead of protecting the public, the state is treating women like criminals and using public space as a hunting ground. There have even been comparisons between this system and the surveillance methods used by authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world.
Despite official denials, activists continue to gather evidence. Some are documenting cases of SMS warnings and sharing them with international media. Others are trying to build encrypted networks to help people avoid detection.
Human rights groups around the world have condemned the surveillance in Isfahan. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Access Now, and Article 19 have described it as part of a wider crackdown on women’s rights and digital freedom in Iran. They have called on tech companies and governments to take a stand—especially against the export or use of surveillance technology for oppression.
Some digital rights experts have also warned that this case should be a global wake-up call. It shows how governments can misuse even simple tools—like SMS messaging or ID readers—when they are combined with powerful state control. Iran is not the only country using digital systems to monitor behavior, but it is one of the clearest examples of how this technology can be used to target women for not obeying moral laws.
A Future of Control or Resistance?
The case of Isfahan is not just about one city or one law—it is a warning. It shows how a government can use digital technology, not to empower or connect its people, but to monitor, threaten, and isolate them. The surveillance system revealed by Filterban is not a temporary measure. It is part of a larger shift toward total control of public life, especially for women.
The integration of mobile data tracking, facial recognition, ID scanning, and coordinated law enforcement is building a society where citizens are expected to police themselves—or be punished. And the targets are clear: women, activists, youth, and anyone who challenges the state’s idea of “order.”
This is happening even after the Islamic regime claimed to postpone or soften its hijab laws. While there may be no official national law enforcing compulsory hijab at this time, cities like Isfahan are becoming test zones for unofficial and experimental systems of control. These systems are quiet, hidden, and often denied by state officials—but they are real.
On one side, the regime might expand this model. Surveillance zones could grow. More advanced tools could be imported or developed. Data collection could become faster, deeper, and more automatic. The separation between daily life and state control could disappear entirely.
On the other side, resistance is growing. People are learning how these systems work. Activists and digital experts are educating citizens on how to protect their privacy. International support for women in Iran has strengthened, and the conversation about surveillance is no longer only about hijab—it’s about freedom and dignity in the digital age.
What makes the situation in Isfahan so alarming is not just the technology. It is the logic behind it: that the state has the right to decide how people dress, how they appear in public, and how their families should control them. It’s a logic that has no place in a free society.
From women refusing to wear the hijab despite the risks, to families speaking out against threats, to citizens sharing this story with the world—the fight is not over. It is happening in the streets of Isfahan, on encrypted messaging apps, in digital exile, and in every space where people demand to live without fear.
What is at stake is not just privacy, or clothing, or even law. What is at stake is the right to be unobserved—to exist in public without fear, without shame, and without being followed by a signal in your pocket.
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