The Shah’s fixation on military might, symbolized by the obsession with F-14 fighter jets, epitomized the fundamental contradiction of his rule. Here was a regime that prioritized expanding its military arsenal over addressing the pressing needs of its population—education, healthcare, and basic infrastructure. When Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, the head of the Planning and Budget Organization, pleaded for budget reallocations to electricity or agriculture, his proposals were dismissed. Instead, the Shah’s paranoia about external threats dictated policy. The result was a classic case of military Keynesianism: massive defense spending with negligible returns for the domestic economy.
In his interviews with the Iranian Oral History Archive at Harvard University, Farmanfarmaian emphasizes that the Shah and other military generals were not interested in his advice and easily ignored internal crises. Farmanfarmaian says the Shah told him that his mistake, and the mistake of others like him, was thinking that Iran’s borders were just the lines on the map, while in reality, Iran’s borders stretched all the way to the Horn of Africa.
This tension wasn’t unique to Iran under the Shah. Similar dynamics unfolded in post-colonial states where ruling elites, often under the influence of Cold War geopolitics, traded social investments for weapons, fostering dependency on imperial powers. The Shah’s Iran was effectively a client state, where military acquisitions doubled as a political insurance policy, ensuring loyalty to Washington while deepening inequalities at home.
Paranoia and “Strategic Depth”
The Shah’s notion that Iran’s borders stretched “to the Horn of Africa” reveals a colonial logic of control, dressed in nationalist garb. It’s a worldview that justifies internal repression and external aggression under the pretense of national security. This same logic underpins the Islamic Republic’s doctrine of “strategic depth” and its support for proxies across the region. Different ideology, same imperial ambition.
But the Shah’s paranoia had internal roots too. The emphasis on external threats obscured his fear of domestic instability—workers, students, and intellectuals demanding rights and representation. His regime, like many authoritarian ones, conflated dissent with existential danger. By labeling any internal challenge as subversive or foreign-backed, the Shah effectively undermined the potential for grassroots social reform.
Electricity blackouts in Tehran and other cities during the summer of 1977 are emblematic of the regime’s misplaced priorities. While defense spending ballooned, basic utilities faltered. This wasn’t just an economic failure; it was a moral one. The Shah’s decision to prioritize fighter jets over hospitals and power plants highlights how militarized economies exacerbate social inequality.
The situation in Iran remains similar more than 40 years later, with one key difference: the Islamic regime now blames the United States and economic sanctions as the main cause of the crisis. However, the words of the Islamic president are clear—he echoes Farmanfarmaian’s statements: “We don’t have money!” Meanwhile, it is not just economic sanctions but militarism, corruption and mismanagement that are seen as the real drivers of the current crisis.
Farmanfarmaian, in his interview, says that the minister explained, “We don’t have enough available capacity. In two or three years, we will face power outages.” He adds that reports from the ministry and others confirmed that capacity was seriously declining. The people, especially workers and peasants, bore the brunt of these failures—cut off from basic services while being silenced by a repressive state.
However, the Islamic regime not only refuses to listen to dissenting voices but also heavily relies on maximum suppression. The staggering 200% increase in the military and security budget for the coming year turns all the regime officials’ rhetoric about addressing internal crises into claims that are not just populist but are more about convincing factions within the power structure to adjust the regime’s long-term strategies.
Post-1979, the Islamic Republic criticized the Shah’s “Westernization” and imperialist ties, yet it inherited and perpetuated many of his regime’s contradictions. Its “strategic depth” doctrine and the “Axis of Resistance” rhetoric mirror the Shah’s regional ambitions. While the slogans changed—from modernization to anti-imperialism—the underlying imperial logic remained intact. Resources that could alleviate poverty or build infrastructure instead bankroll regional militias and ideological wars.
Lessons from History
The Shah’s policies and their continuation under the Islamic Republic underscore a fundamental challenge: how can states in the Global South balance sovereignty, development, and democracy without falling into the traps of militarism or imperial overreach? Iran’s experience shows that imperial ambitions—whether framed as nationalism or anti-imperialism—come at a steep cost to ordinary people. Economic planning that prioritizes welfare over warfare is not just a technical matter but a profoundly political one.
In Iran’s case, the unresolved issues of militarization, paranoia, and social inequality remain obstacles to genuine progress. The challenge for any emancipatory politics is to break with this cycle, dismantle the logic of empire, and place the needs of workers, farmers, and students at the center of priorities. That is the true measure of sovereignty.
On the international stage, the issue is neither the Shah’s regime nor the Islamic regime. The real matter is curbing militarism and Iran’s pursuit of becoming a military and economic power in one of the world’s most critical geopolitical regions. Any political structure that commits to abandoning this military ambition will bring Iran out of isolation. However, this comes at a cost: either becoming a puppet of Eastern or Western powers or transforming into a neutral and non-aligned force in the region.
The past century of Iranian history has shown that governments have been eager to align with one of the major global powers to achieve this so-called strategic depth, alongside brutally suppressing internal dissent. One thing is clear today: the dominance of military leadership in Iran has proven that they will not abandon their pursuit of strategic depth and their ambition to become a military-ideological power.
Imperial Pragmatism
The 1979 revolution in Iran represented a genuine grassroots movement, challenging entrenched political and economic structures. It was an expression of the deep social contradictions that had accumulated under the Shah’s regime—a revolution from below. However, the Islamic movement swiftly crushed it, transforming the aspirations of millions into an authoritarian project.
The United States, recognizing the utility of this reactionary force, incorporated it into its broader Cold War strategy, crafting a “Green Belt” to contain the Soviet Union. In this context, the Islamic Republic became a tool of U.S. geopolitical design, despite its anti-American rhetoric. The Soviet Union, in turn, made a catastrophic misjudgment by viewing this movement through the lens of anti-imperialist populism. This miscalculation not only abandoned the Iranian left to its fate but paved the way for its systematic and brutal suppression—a historical defeat with far-reaching consequences.
The Islamic Republic’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, combined with its brutal suppression of the left, effectively kept the Middle East away from the threat of leftist and socialist movements for decades. Instead, it plunged the region into sectarian chaos, enriching the United States through arms sales under the guise of providing security to others. Cloaked in human rights rhetoric and occasional aggressive posturing, U.S. policy went towards containing the Islamic Republic rather than seeking regime change or military confrontation.
This strategy reflects the pragmatism of imperial power: a preference for stability and predictability over direct confrontation. Even despite Trump bombastic threats, the focus remained on achieving an agreement—one that would confine the Islamic regime’s ambitions to within its borders, even in the event of nuclear armament. Or at least its power be recognized to the extent that it refrains from threatening the most important U.S. ally in the region: Israel.
This policy underlines what imperialism is: while all powers portraying themselves as a defender of democracy and human rights, they prioritizes geopolitical stability over the liberation of oppressed peoples. For Iran, this has meant decades of isolation and repression, with its people caught in the crossfire of internal despotism and external containment.
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