I will not discuss the authoritarian nature of the Islamic Republic following the inclusion of the Supreme Leader by the first Assembly of Experts — even the non-absolute Supreme Leader. For those unaware, I recommend following related links.
But, I want to just talk why some people vote? For those who vote, the focus is not on democracy but on the situation of Iran.
The political situation in Iran is like a patient with 80% of their body affected by leukemia or AIDS. Those who still have hope in this sick and paralyzed democracy ask what should be done with this patient. They don’t abandon the patient but use their energy to keep him alive, hoping for a miracle cure. In both cases, scientific progress has led to effective drugs that can cure the patient.
In Iran, reformists see this type of treatment as too radical: advocating for the removal of the Supreme Leader from the Islamic Republic as a reform slogan. This is more like radical surgery than reform, which is like medical treatment. It involves changing the nature of the Islamic Republic to free it from religious despotism, rent-seeking, and systemic corruption. Others vote because they find this style of governance appropriate for various reasons.
These are some reasons why people vote in Iran, but many Iranians do not vote for these reasons.
History of Elections in the Islamic Republic in Eight Periods
Elections in Iran have gone through seven periods of four to eight years and are now on the verge of the seventh period.
1. Revolution and War (Khomeinism): The first period coincided with the first decade of the revolution. Iran truly experienced the revolution. Urban and factory councils were widely formed. Oil workers tried to take control of self-management and oil exports. However, the project of the Islamic Republic was different from this. The society was brutally repressed. The army, which had previously only shot at people during demonstrations, began bombing and missile attacks on cities. Mass executions started, and many former political prisoners who had been freed by the revolution were re-imprisoned and executed as counter-revolutionaries. The Islamic reactionary forces of Khomeini and Bazargan had been revived from the trash heap of Iran’s history, dusted off, and unleashed upon the people and the revolution to prevent the victory of the people’s freedom struggles and the establishment of a left-leaning political system, which was considered the most likely outcome of the 1979 revolution.
With widespread repression, the Islamic movement nailed another nail in the coffin of the revolution by occupying the US embassy, and the ensuing war and then the massacre of political prisoners effectively crushed the revolution. After the war ended with Khomeini’s admission of drinking the “poison chalice” (a term Khomeini used to accept the ceasefire with Iraq), they realized their mistake, which became the seed of the movement later called reforms. The end of the war marked the beginning of reforms — and reforms were nothing but the deep disenchantment of the “elite cadre” of the Islamic Republic with the historical process of the Assembly of Experts that had imposed the Supreme Leader onto the democratic structure of the revolution. The womb of this reform movement was also in the presidency.
2. Reconstruction (Rafsanjanism): The second decade was the decade of reconstruction, during which people began to express their dissatisfaction through voting towards the end. Rafsanjani‘s construction was economic progress without political progress, unsuccessfully imitating China. Strikes and urban uprisings had begun again after the bloody repressions of the 1980s. The killing of writers, artists, and intellectuals, who had survived the mass executions of leftists in prisons, began during this time. The construction did not achieve much, but the reform movement gradually gained life under its shadow and began to speak and walk. The phenomenon of Khatami was proposed as an exit strategy for the Islamic regime from a historical deadlock and a means to avoid an inevitable collapse. The reform movement, which had started with the poison chalice, was able to elect Khatami as its symbol and spokesperson after a decade of embryonic life. But how?
3. Reforms (Khatamism): The next eight-year period was the two terms of Mohammad Khatami‘s presidency. The third and fifth periods can also be called the periods of election engineering. Why did the system resort to election engineering? Because in the first two periods (revolution and reconstruction), voters hoped for reconstruction. They thought these goals were possible within the framework of the existing Islamic Republic. Therefore, the system did not see people’s participation as problematic. But with the failure of the reconstruction project, people decided to use their votes to change the current situation and challenge the system. We know that this Islamic Republic system owed all its legitimacy to people’s participation — because no prominent cleric in Najaf, Qom, or Mashhad had taken Khomeini’s Supreme Leader theory seriously, and some had even openly opposed it. Therefore, the theocratic system of the Islamic Republic had built its legitimacy not on the Supreme Leader but on public participation from the beginning.
Now that foundation was shaken. The solution was to resort to “election engineering.” The system decided to engineer elections twice — in the elections leading to the victory of Khatami and Rouhani — and in both cases, it failed. The plan was to bring a candidate with about a 5% chance of being elected, so people would vote for him, heating the election pot and seating their chosen candidate as president.
In 1997, Khamenei, as the country’s leader, clearly supported the candidacy of a very harsh conservative fundamentalist, and even an old politician living in US met him in the hope of perhaps becoming the foreign minister or at least the permanent representative to the United Nations. But these expectations were all in vain. People saw through the government’s plan and used the reverse engineering trick against the system.
Of course, all these elections were votes for conservatives who could only carry the reformist title within the framework of the Islamic Republic. As Machiavelli said with a meaningful smile, he did not pay attention to the local goddess of fortune and did not “manly” (virtu) seize it… and perhaps if someone could do that, he would not come out of the narrow tunnel of qualification to have a remote chance of becoming president. He did not want to respond to the attack on the dormitory by armed thugs during his golden honeymoon period when he had the support of over 70% of the eligible population. This was the nature of the kind of democracy that the system of the Supreme Leader could coexist with.
And this situation led to disaster in Khatami’s second term. Khatami presented a government to the sixth parliament, completely under the control of reformists, that would have been approved by the previous parliament dominated by conservative majority. This was an unnecessary retreat. The reason was not only Khatami’s mistake or lack of courage. The nature of the qualification system, which regretted Khatami’s election, was to disqualify all his reformist rivals. Therefore, Khatami was the only option for reforms. He could have said he did not want to be president, and this claim was popular among reformists because their option was either Khatami or nothing. Neither Khatami nor Rouhani gave their supporters the slightest promise to advance reform goals and aspirations in their second terms because they had no rivals. And they had no rivals because the qualification system had made their job easier by eliminating rivals.
This is when regime opponents say elections in Iran are meaningless and there is no democracy at all. The reality is that reformists also owe their rise to power partly to the qualification oversight. The same system that made party freedom impossible eliminated all domestic rivals of the reformists who could have been active.
4. Neo-Fundamentalism (Ahmadinejadism): The reason for Ahmadinejad‘s presidency is said to be that voters were deeply disappointed with Khatami’s second term and many did not participate in the election, resulting in that “miracle of the 21st century” being elected. In Ahmadinejad’s first term, the regime had no reason to engineer and rig the election because polls showed Ahmadinejad would win. Even polls controlled by conservatives and reformists showed this. The problem was that even within the regime, they did not believe these polls. But Ahmadinejad won in the first term and went to the second round with Rafsanjani. I remember very well that the majority were shocked. Anyway, Rafsanjani was better known, although there was a lot of public hatred due to the bloody repressions during his presidency.
In Ahmadinejad’s second term, voters regretted their non-participation in the previous election and participated enthusiastically in the 2009 election in favor of Mir-Hossein Mousavi. The regime blatantly rigged the election. The Green Movement dealt a severe blow to the regime’s legitimacy. I remember very well on the first day Mousavi called for a silent protest, millions of people in Tehran took to the streets. The regime was completely shocked by this reaction and for a few weeks, there was no news of repression or even a symbolic police presence on the streets. A significant part of the regime separated from it. One group turned to embezzlement and another to asylum, betrayal, and overthrow. Spying for Israel and the United States took root among small and large officials who had separated from the Islamic regime, and the criterion for embezzlement surpassed all boundaries.
5. Return of Reforms (Rouhanism): Apparently, the regime had learned its lesson from the reputational damage of the Green Movement and again resorted to election engineering and once again got the reverse engineering trick from the people. Hassan Rouhani was elected. Again, like during Khatami’s time, Iran’s economic and international situation improved. Iran managed to overcome America-bashing and signed the JCPOA with Javad Zarif‘s team, which it still benefits from despite Trump’s withdrawal. The problem of corruption, rent-seeking, thefts, and espionage that had started during Ahmadinejad’s time not only did not decrease but continued with the same intensity.
6. Transition from Theocratic Hybrid System to Authoritarian System (Raisism): Once again, the system was tired of election engineering (perhaps because it had failed twice) and decided to settle the matter once and for all and turn the path towards North Korea instead of China. This time, the Guardian Council left no rivals for Raisi and disqualified anyone who could challenge
him. The Islamic regime abandoned the election engineering game, and people did not participate in it. This period ended after only three years and some months with a helicopter crash.
7. Return to Election Engineering in Favor of Reformists: This period has not yet emerged but seems to have a good chance. Why did the Islamic regime take this step? Was it the necessity of cohesion against foreign attack or the leader’s sharp conflict with the opportunistic conservatives? Whatever it may be, the reality is that the difference between Medicali and other presidential candidates is significant.
What about those who won’t vote?
In the past years, Iran has seen significant protests and unrest. Many Iranians are increasingly disillusioned with the political system. Several key factors contribute to why Iranians might choose not to vote in the upcoming election.
First, the political system in Iran is heavily controlled by the ruling elite, with the Supreme Leader holding significant power. Many Iranians feel that their votes do not lead to real change because the candidates are often pre-selected and approved by the Guardian Council, which limits the choice of truly reformist or oppositional candidates. This controlled process undermines the sense of genuine democratic participation.
Second, there has been widespread dissatisfaction with economic conditions. Sanctions, government mismanagement, and corruption have led to high inflation, unemployment, and a declining standard of living. The government’s failure to address these issues effectively has led many to lose faith in the political process as a means of improving their lives.
Third, the government’s response to protests and dissent has been repressive. Any demonstrations in Iran were met with violent crackdowns, mass arrests, and internet blackouts. This harsh response has created an atmosphere of fear and mistrust, discouraging many from participating in any government-sanctioned activity, including voting.
Fourth, the real power does not lie with elected officials but with unelected bodies such as the IRGC and the clerical establishment. This belief diminishes the perceived impact of voting, as many feel that elected officials are unable to implement meaningful change due to these overriding influences.
Lastly, there is a significant portion of the population, particularly among the youth, who feel disconnected from the traditional political discourse. They seek more profound social and cultural changes that they do not believe can be achieved through the current electoral system.
In summary, the combination of a controlled political process, economic hardship, repressive responses to dissent, the overshadowing influence of unelected bodies, and a disconnection from traditional politics has led many Iranians to believe that voting will not bring about the changes they desire. This disillusionment is a significant reason why many may choose to abstain from voting in the upcoming election.
Main Discussion
Voters generally hope that with different managers, they will have a free, prosperous, democratic, and secular Iran. In public discussions, they claim that to achieve expected Iran, there must be an Iran to reform. Right-wing tendencies (both in the position and the opposition) have shown that Iran is not important to them. They even think about bombing cities to gain power. But there is a population that is not willing to vote for what these right-wingers say but for other ideals. On the other hand, there is a population that votes with the same hopes but when it comes to protest, they join the first group on the streets.
During the widespread protests of recent years, protesters who were imprisoned or whose relatives were killed declared that they participated before in elections with hope for a better future. The repressions, however, showed that the Islamic regime does not change with such elections or top-down deals.
What you think?