At midnight GMT on September 28, 2025, the United Nations’ “snapback” mechanism took effect and reimposed six pre-JCPOA Security Council resolutions on Iran. In one move, the world returned to a sanctions regime last seen before 2015. Western governments presented this as a necessary response to Iran’s nuclear trajectory; Tehran called it an abuse of law. The impact was immediate: new political tension abroad, emergency deliberations at home, and renewed pressure on ordinary Iranians.
What “Snapback” Means
Snapback is the clause in UNSCR 2231 that allows participants in the 2015 nuclear deal to restore prior UN sanctions if there is “significant non-performance.” After the E3 (France, Germany, UK) formally triggered the process on August 28, and a Russian-Chinese bid to delay it failed at the Security Council, all lifted UN sanctions were restored. The UK government confirmed the reactivation of Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929, covering nuclear- and missile-related bans, an arms embargo, finance and banking limits, shipping inspections, and designations on entities and individuals. In substance, this resets Iran’s international position to pre-2015 isolation.
Inside Iran, the Majles held a closed-door session to assess the shock to households and markets. Speaker Qalibaf called the move “illegal” and hinted at “important decisions” to shield people’s livelihoods—discussing measures like electronic coupon programs (kalabarg)—while signaling that Iran would not comply with what it regards as unlawful UN resolutions. The session showed the leadership’s expectation of tighter budgets, lower export income, and restricted trade—and, therefore, the need to reallocate and cut to avoid social backlash.
Government spokesperson has, in recent months, publicly framed fiscal consolidation and restructuring as unavoidable under sanctions pressure—a line repeated as the snapback deadline approached. In short: officials are bracing for a harder external squeeze and a domestic distribution problem over who bears the cost.
Iran’s message is defiant and legalistic. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that terminated sanctions “cannot be revived,” accusing the U.S. of betraying diplomacy and the E3 of abusing legal mechanisms they themselves failed to honor. The Foreign Ministry amplified this line in a formal letter, calling the move “legally baseless and morally unacceptable” and warning of a “firm and appropriate response.” Ayatollah Khamenei reiterated deep distrust of U.S. promises, arguing that concessions in the JCPOA era failed to deliver durable relief and that Iran will not dismantle its defensive capacities.
Western and International Reactions
The E3 welcomed snapback and said their immediate goal is to rapidly reimpose UN restrictions, urging Tehran not to escalate and to return to talks. The U.S. State Department said the reimposition was necessary due to significant non-compliance, while also insisting that diplomacy remains possible. In Brussels, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas emphasized that the sanctions’ return “must not be the end of diplomacy,” signaling a will to keep a political track open even while aligning with UN measures.
The Security Council’s failure to extend sanctions relief—after a last-minute push to delay snapback—exposed great-power divisions. The UN process ended with a return to pressure; Russia and China objected, but lacked votes to block the restoration.
For working people, the sanctions are not abstractions. Snapback tightens the arms and missile embargoes, re-freezes assets, restrains banking channels, and revives cargo inspection authorities. Markets read this quickly: the rial weakened, importers adjusted risk premiums, and households anticipated new price spikes. The macro-mechanism is simple: fewer export options, higher transaction costs, and scarcer hard currency translate into inflation and insecurity for ordinary families.
Austerity and rationing tools—electronic coupons and targeted subsidies—may soften the blow for the poorest, but they do not solve the core problem: a constricted external account and a financial blockade that raises the cost of every essential import, from medicines to machine parts. The Al Jazeera and Reuters reports capture the public mood: fear of higher prices, fear of war, and fatigue with permanent crisis.
Sanctions are instruments of power in the world market. They do not fall on states as such; they are transmitted through prices, access to credit, logistics, and insurance, ending up as lower real wages and higher reproduction costs for the popular classes. In this sense, snapback is a coercive economic act that subordinates a semi-peripheral economy to the security priorities of the core. It invites us to ask: who pays, who decides, and who benefits?
Iran’s claim to sovereign control over peaceful nuclear technology is legitimate. The selective use of international law by powerful states is obvious: their allies’ arsenals are tolerated; their adversaries face blockade. The E3’s language of “non-performance” and the U.S. call for compliance reflect this asymmetry of force—and this is why many inside and outside Iran see the move as imperial overreach, not neutral rule-enforcement.
In late September, Ali Larijani—the newly reappointed secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council—held a three-hour meeting with the Chamber of Commerce. State media framed his line as ‘ready for fair negotiations,’ while Chamber figures pressed to seat an economic team alongside political talks. On social media, a filmed exchange captured a sharper warning—“either negotiate or face an army of unemployed”—a phrase not carried by major outlets but consistent with the discussion’s thrust. The timing matters: the UN snapback helped push the free-market dollar toward 110,000 tomans as the official rate stayed near 72,000, widening a dual-rate system that rewards arbitrage and punishes wages through price pass-through. For workers, business calls for ‘stability and security’ translate into basic survival: one transparent FX rule for essentials, wage indexation, and protected drug imports—otherwise relief, if it comes, will be privatized at the top while households take the hit.
A Left Critique; center the people
We should ask how domestic choices were made. Did workers, unions, independent experts, and elected bodies get to debate the economic costs and benefits of nuclear policy? When the state answers social anxiety with closed sessions, rationing from above, or policing of speech, it shifts the burden onto those with the least protection. A socialist standpoint holds that transparency, accountability, and civil freedoms are elements of public strength, not luxuries to be suspended “until after the crisis.”
The alternative to Western pressure is not a blank check at home. Policy should be judged by material outcomes for the working class: stable prices, access to food and medicine, dignified employment, and a democratic voice in strategic decisions. If sanctions cut purchasing power, counter-policy cannot mean private windfalls for elites and public austerity for everyone else. It should socialize risk and cost—through windfall taxes, wage protection, and public investment that keeps production and care systems alive.
Sanctions also produced an economy where opacity pays. A class of intermediaries—kâsebân-e tahrim (sanctions profiteers)—profits from multiple exchange rates, off-book oil and petrochemical sales, and monopoly import licenses. Without union oversight and public disclosure, any future relief risks being siphoned off before it reaches households.
According to the Iran Labour Confederation (ILC), workers held 2,396 protest gatherings and 169 strikes in 2024 across many sectors and provinces, focused on wage arrears, job security, safety, and insurance. This scale signals a broad material crisis, not isolated incidents.
In late September, Ali Larijani—the newly reappointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council—met for three hours with the Chamber of Commerce. State media presented him as “ready for fair negotiations,” while Chamber figures pressed to seat an economic team alongside political talks. A widely shared video captured a sharper warning: “either negotiate or face an army of unemployed”—a line not carried by major outlets but consistent with the meeting’s thrust.
The timing matters. The UN snapback pushed the free-market dollar toward 110,000 tomans while the official rate stayed near 72,000, widening a dual-rate system that rewards arbitrage and punishes wages through price pass-through. For workers, calls for “stability and security” translate into basic survival: one transparent FX rule for essentials, wage indexation, and protected drug imports—otherwise any relief will be privatized at the top while households absorb the hit.
How the money was made in the past?
- Dual and preferential exchange rates → arbitrage and leakage. The 2018–2022 “4200-rial dollar” (a subsidized FX window for “essential imports”) created huge rents. Parliamentarians and audits flagged billions that cannot be accounted for; investigative coverage tracked the missing trail and the price shocks after the window’s removal. This is textbook rent creation under scarcity.
- Petrochemical “return of currency” frauds. Managers and brokers retained export earnings abroad or funneled them through fronts “to bypass sanctions,” then settled domestically at unofficial rates. Courts handed heavy sentences in the so-called “Petrochem Gate” cases; reporting shows trials proceeding even as several principals fled.
- Shadow-banking and exchange-house networks. U.S. Treasury’s 2025 designations detail exchange-house webs moving billions for oil/petrochemical sales outside the formal banking system—exactly the gray-zone channels that thrive on sanctions and opacity. Whatever you think of U.S. policy, the mechanics are real and map onto domestic critiques.
- Laundering via third-country real estate hubs. The “Dubai Unlocked” trove and follow-ups identify Iranian oil/petrochemical defendants and relatives with property portfolios in the UAE—classic sanction-evasion cash sinks.
- State-adjacent smuggling. Fuel and crude smuggling balloon under price gaps and border militarization. Officials themselves have cited staggering volumes (e.g., ~20 million liters of fuel per day) and seizures of stockpiles equivalent to a refinery’s daily output; separate cases name state managers and ex-security officials tied to oil/fuel rackets during sanction years.
Case box — Babak Zanjani (2012–): the archetype of sanctions-era oil brokerage under Ahmadinejad: off-book crude sales, opaque accounts, and missing proceeds. His conviction and long, still-unsettled debts exemplify how “patriotic” evasion quickly becomes private accumulation.
Case box — Petrochem Gate (2010s): managers used “bypassing sanctions” to justify withholding export currency and playing FX spreads; later, media traced fugitives’ assets abroad. Courts issued cumulative 180 years in sentences; yet without structural fixes, the incentive structure endures.
Real estate and money hubs in Dubai: Investigative reports show how properties in the UAE have become pools for suspicious funds linked to Iran’s oil/petrochemical and banking networks. They highlight the systematic scale of money laundering.
Fuel smuggling: Because of the price gap between Iran and its neighbors, estimates point to smuggling of tens of millions of liters per day. At times, the value has been compared to the government’s annual subsidy bill. Reports trace this market from militarized borders to rent-seeking chains tied to state managers.
Video of the retirees’ Sunday protest gatherings in cities across the country. This one is from today in Rasht, Gilan. The protesters are demanding the release of three imprisoned labor activists. They are chanting: “We give our lives for freedom; we do not live under oppression.” These rallies are held simultaneously in dozens of cities nationwide.
Who pays for leakage?
While elites arbitraged rents, households absorbed inflation and shortages. The World Bank links intensified sanctions since 2018 to renewed contraction, >40% inflation for several years, and a sharp hit to purchasing power—classic regressive incidence. Iran’s corruption-perceptions score fell to 23/100 in 2024 (151st/180), signaling a deteriorating enforcement environment where relief can be captured unless guardrails exist.
The current configuration is a stalemate: Western pressure seeks to force concessions; Tehran refuses, citing law and dignity. Experience since 2015 shows that pressure alone did not deliver stability, and symbolic defiance alone could not secure living standards. A workable exit would require: (1) verifiable, time-bound steps on the nuclear file that satisfy inspection requirements without humiliating sovereignty; (2) front-loaded relief that reduces costs for essential imports and credit lines; and (3) domestic guarantees that relief reaches households—wages, medicines, public services—rather than disappearing into rents.
In the last days before snapback, both sides floated conditional offers; talks failed and the UN channel closed. But the EU’s line—sanctions plus a door for negotiation—and even Washington’s formal claim that diplomacy remains possible, leave minimal space to rebuild a sequenced bargain. On the Iranian side, anchoring any bargain in social priorities—not just geopolitical posture—would strengthen legitimacy at home.
Sanctions are never just “sender vs. target.” They create corridors—ship-to-ship transfers, free-trade zones, real-estate havens—where sanctioned oil turns into offshore balances while basic goods at home get pricier. Unless diplomacy plus domestic rule-of-law closes these corridors, the profiteer economy outlives the sanctions and workers keep paying through prices, unsafe jobs, and repression. (This is exactly why labor groups push the ILO to investigate, expel regime-affiliated “worker” delegates, and recognize independent voices.)
Sanctions are class policy by other means—but so are the Islamic Republic’s own policies. A security state fused with patronage capitalism has turned crisis into a business model: dual exchange rates for insiders, off-book oil for brokers, austerity for workers, and police for dissent. Calling this “defense of sovereignty” does not change its content. National dignity begins at the factory gate, not in closed sessions.
Opposing imperial coercion does not mean endorsing a homegrown oligarchy. The test of any policy is simple: does it raise wages in real terms, secure medicine and food, make workplaces safe, and expand the freedom to organize? The regime’s mix—militarized management, emergency rule over labor, opaque budgets—fails that test. It reproduces a minority’s privilege and socializes scarcity for everyone else.
A people-first exit requires breaking the profiteer economy at its roots: one transparent FX rule with public ledgers; confiscation of corrupt windfalls and return to public use; civil control over all military-linked holdings; full freedom of association, strike, and collective bargaining; independent price and safety oversight with union seats; universal social rights funded from resource rents; and recallable officials with open books. No “national security” exception to bread and freedom.
Any negotiated relief without these guarantees is another income stream for the top and another queue for the bottom. The choice is not “West vs. state,” but society vs. a system that lives on scarcity. Center the worker, legalize the union, open the books, and make the country governable by its people. Only then will diplomacy translate into life—rather than one more season of promises paid for by the poor.
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