Europe and the Struggle Against Imperialism at Home

On 30 September 2026, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued that European states should acquire, within ten years, the capacity to undertake operations comparable to American strikes against Iran’s nuclear…

Class organization, the costs of resistance, and the future of the antiwar movement

On 30 September 2026, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued that European states should acquire, within ten years, the capacity to undertake operations comparable to American strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. He also proposed that Europeans, rather than Americans, should be able to confront the Houthis in the Red Sea. He cited the use of European bases by American aircraft supporting operations against Iran. These remarks did not announce a NATO mission against Iran, which lies outside the alliance’s territory. They described a desired expansion of European military capabilities beyond it.[1]

Such capabilities require public expenditure, industrial production, transport infrastructure and labour. Europe’s military future will be determined not only by security conferences but by decisions about budgets, work and the organization of production. The question for Europe’s antiwar movements is what social power they can develop to contest those decisions. The mobilizations against the destruction of Gaza have made opposition visible, but they have not secured a sustained capacity to interrupt European governments’ material support for Israel. The gap between public opposition and effective pressure needs a political explanation.


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Who is allowed political independence?

The uprising that began in Iran in December 2025 was rooted in deteriorating living conditions and developed into an open challenge to the Islamic Republic. Protesters carried the memory of the November 2019 killings and the repression of Woman, Life, Freedom. In January 2026, Human Rights Watch documented mass killings by security forces, drawing on testimony and verified audiovisual evidence.[2] Participation took place with knowledge of a recurring risk of lethal repression and in a country where independent political and labour organization faces severe restrictions.

The United States and Israel sought political advantage from the protests. The Islamic Republic described them through the language of foreign interference. In some Western anti-imperialist commentary, the possibility of external exploitation became grounds for doubting the protesters’ autonomy. This collapsed two distinct questions: why a movement emerged, and how other states hoped to use it. Struggles against compulsory hijab, independent labour campaigns and opposition to capital punishment have histories that cannot be reconstructed from statements by Trump or Netanyahu.

The struggles of Iranians are judged by the outcomes foreign powers hope to secure through them; the struggles of Western activists are judged by their declared intentions. The asymmetry matters because the costs of protest are so different. An Iranian demonstrator may be shot before any judicial process begins. In much of Europe, protesters ordinarily retain legal avenues of association, counsel and defence, even where police violence, prosecution and severe restrictions occur. These are different distributions of political risk, not a contest in personal courage. Yet it is precisely some of those who dismiss Iranian protesters as instruments of foreign policy who have not developed a comparable capacity to confront their own states’ participation in war.

Europe’s antiwar movements have not been inactive. But the problem cannot be settled by counting marches, arrests or declarations of solidarity. It concerns the relationship between political commitment and the capacity to make the continuation of military cooperation materially difficult.

From mobilization to social power

Frances Fox Piven makes a useful distinction in her study of Occupy Wall Street. Occupy placed inequality at the centre of American debate and established encampments across hundreds of cities. Its success in communication did not amount to the exercise of power. In Piven’s account, movements of subordinated groups acquire leverage when they can interrupt the cooperative relations on which dominant institutions depend.[3]

Production requires workers; distribution requires transport; finance depends on the participation of debtors. Extended supply chains and just-in-time production may increase the vulnerability of these relations to the withdrawal of cooperation. Yet dependence does not automatically become leverage. Piven identifies the difficulty of recognizing one’s power, the legal and customary regulation of cooperation, the need to coordinate participants, and the threat of retaliation. Her discussion of Occupy’s proposed debtors’ strike is revealing precisely because the organizers could not mobilize withdrawal on the scale needed to test its potential.[3]

The same distinction applies to antiwar organizing. Arms manufacture, ports, aviation, freight and public institutions all rely on workers and established systems of cooperation. A mass demonstration communicates a demand. Coordinated work stoppages can affect the operations through which state policy is implemented. A general strike could extend that pressure across sectors, while sustained public assemblies would connect workplace action to wider social participation.

There are existing examples, though they do not prove that a lasting strategy has been established. In October 2024, dockworkers in Piraeus prevented a shipment of ammunition destined for Israel from being loaded. In October 2025, an Italian general strike disrupted rail transport while demonstrations spread across more than a hundred cities.[4][5] These episodes show that parts of the labour movement can intervene in the infrastructure of war. They also pose a further question: how can the capacity revealed in a stoppage survive the event, resist retaliation and spread across workplaces?

Such collective pressure also clarifies the question of revolutionary force. A strike that halts circulation, a coordinated refusal of labour across public services, or a sustained occupation of public space challenges the state’s authority to determine the acceptable limits of political conflict. The state may respond with legal sanctions, economic coercion or police force. The question is how organized social power confronts the institutions that maintain existing relations, and how participants collectively sustain the risks of doing so.

Kurdistan’s strikes and the problem of organization

Iranian Kurdistan offers a recent example of coordination under far more dangerous political conditions. On 8 January 2026, following a call by seven Kurdish parties and civic organizations in solidarity with protests elsewhere in Iran, shops and markets closed across 39 cities, according to the rights organization Hengaw. Political prisoners also joined through hunger strikes.[6] Kurdpa reported participation by shopkeepers, cultural workers and service establishments, alongside threats of closure, arrest and prosecution directed at businesses.[7]

The mobilization had antecedents. After Jina Amini’s killing in September 2022, closures were reported in Saqqez, Sanandaj, Mahabad, Bukan, Marivan, Baneh and other towns, alongside street protests.[8] These episodes suggest the persistence of political and local networks capable of translating a call into coordinated action. A declaration by parties alone cannot close markets. Participation depends on the ability of different groups to communicate, to recognize a shared interest and to accept risk.

The composition of these strikes also matters. Shopkeepers, wage workers, cultural workers, students and political prisoners are not a single class category. Their coordinated participation shows how a political demand can gain force through relationships among distinct social groups. At the same time, available reports do not establish the extent of industrial work stoppages or the closure of government services; the shutdown of shops cannot stand as a measure of interruption to the whole regional economy. The evidence supports a claim about the breadth of organization and social cooperation, not a claim of complete economic paralysis.

Kurdistan is not a transferable blueprint for European antiwar movements. Its economic structures, political history and forms of repression differ. It does, however, undermine the assumption that diminished political opportunity must mean an absence of collective capacity. In Europe, where unions, educational institutions and political associations enjoy broader formal scope, the central question is how their resources can be joined in a sustained challenge to militarization.

The political consequences of resignation

Declining union density, the relocation of industry and the weakening of many left parties have changed the terrain of class struggle in Europe. They have not removed the dependence of capital and government on labour. The growth of logistics, services and transnational supply chains has altered where that dependence is concentrated. Piven’s analysis suggests that the organizational problem has changed, not disappeared.

Treating the historic defeats of the European left as proof that social transformation is no longer possible has political consequences. One is the displacement of anti-imperialist agency abroad. Some campist currents locate effective resistance principally in states and armed organizations confronting Washington or Israel. The geopolitical position of the Islamic Republic, Hezbollah or the Houthis can then outweigh the relations those forces maintain with workers, women and independent movements. Their different political histories do not abolish the need to examine those relations separately.

There is no necessary causal line from organizational decline to campism; the programmes and practices of particular groups require investigation. But the combination of domestic resignation and reliance on foreign military actors offers no route to stronger working-class organization internationally. It weakens the distinction between solidarity with people resisting domination and political identification with the states or armed forces claiming to represent them. Opposing military attacks on Iran does not entail support for the Islamic Republic. Solidarity with Palestinians does not require political agreement with Hamas.

Internationalism demands the ability to recognize independent social movements wherever they arise, including those opposed by governments that also confront Western power. It also demands action where the material capacities of imperial states are produced and maintained. Otherwise the conflicts of other societies become substitutes for organization at home.

A ten-year horizon

Rutte’s timeframe makes the organizing problem concrete. Decisions taken in the coming decade about arms production, transport, public budgets and military infrastructure will shape Europe’s capacity to intervene abroad. An antiwar response cannot depend exclusively on demonstrations summoned when the next attack begins. It requires enduring links among workplace organizations, port and transport workers, public-sector employees, students and local movements; the ability to defend those facing reprisals; and a politics that connects militarization to wages, services, employment and public resources.

The experience of Piraeus and the Italian strike indicates where organized labour already possesses leverage. Kurdistan’s strikes show how political calls may become broad social action when networks endure under repression. Neither example establishes an easy path from disruption to victory. Both show why the organization of collective refusal is a more demanding question than the expression of opposition.

Piven closes her argument by insisting that movements assess retaliation and prepare participants for the risks they are willing to undertake.[3] This is an essential part of the comparison between Iran and Europe. Iranians have mobilized with the documented prospect of being killed in the street. Europe’s antiwar movements operate within a different legal and institutional terrain, with greater scope for continued association and collective defence. The difference does not prescribe identical tactics. It makes the question of unused organizational capacity harder to evade.

A politics against European militarization must build power within the societies whose governments are undertaking it. The expansion of Europe’s military capacity has a timetable. So must the rebuilding of the social capacity to contest it.

Sources

  1. NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General at the Euronews Defence & Space Summit,” 30 September 2026.
  2. Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Growing Evidence of Countrywide Massacres,” 16 January 2026.
  3. Frances Fox Piven, “Interdependent Power: Strategizing for the Occupy Movement,” Current Sociology 62, no. 2 (2014): 223–31, especially 225–30.
  4. Reuters, “Greek Piraeus Port Dockers Block Ammunition Cargo Destined for Israel,” 18 October 2024.
  5. Reuters, report on Italian Gaza solidarity strike, 3 October 2025.
  6. Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, “Kurdistan on Strike as Shops and Markets Close across 39 Cities,” 8 January 2026.
  7. Kurdpa, report on strikes and security threats, 10 January 2026.
  8. Kurdistan Human Rights Network, report on Kurdistan strike following Jina Amini’s killing, 20 September 2022.

AI Transparency Use
This translation produced with the help of AI to make the process faster and more efficient. I use a local language model (Local LLM) that runs directly on my personal laptop, so the texts don’t need to be sent to external servers for processing. Every AI-assisted translation is reviewed and edited by a human before publication. This includes checking the accuracy of the translation, its faithfulness to the original text, and whether the meaning and language have been properly preserved. I use AI simply as a tool to save time. It doesn’t replace human knowledge, judgment, or responsibility. The final responsibility for everything published, including word choices, accuracy of meaning, and editorial decisions, remains with me as the writer.

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